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ChatGPT has exploded into the popular consciousness in recent months, and the hype and concerns about the program have only grown louder with the release of GPT-4, a more powerful version of the software. Its deployment, including with applications such as Microsoft Office, has raised questions about whether the developers or distributors of code that includes ChatGPT, or similar generative pre-trained transformers, could face liability for tort claims such as defamation or false light. One important potential barrier to these claims is the immunity con-ferred by 47 U.S.C. § 230, popularly known as “Section 230.” In this Essay, we make two claims. First, Section 230 is likely to protect the creators, distributors, and hosts of online services that include ChatGPT in many cases. Users of those services, though, may be at greater legal risk than is commonly believed. Second, ChatGPT and its ilk make the analysis of the Section 230 safe harbor more com-plex, both substantively and procedurally. This is likely a negative consequence for the software’s developers and hosts, since complexity in law tends to generate uncertainty, which in turn creates cost. Nonetheless, we contend that Section 230 has more of a role to play in legal questions about ChatGPT than most commentators do—including the principal legislative drafters of Section 230—and that this result is generally a desirable one.